The government of the German State of Brandenburg wanted to buy the lignite mines and power plants from Vattenfall in the Lusatia region to keep them open. The left-far-left coalition was motivated by economic reasons: to prevent job losses and de-industrialisation. But statistics show that Lusatia is actually worse off both economically and socially because of the presence of lignite mining, write Conrad Kunze and Anika Zorn, Social Scientists at the Centre for Environmental Research UFZ in Leipzig. Lusatia’s lignite is a “resource curse” for the region.
The Lusatia region’s landscape is visibly shaped by surface mining. Its lignite was once the main electricity source of the German Democratic Republic. And despite some plans to gradually phase out lignite mining after unification in the 1990s, the industry is still there, though with significantly less personnel than the 60 thousand workers it once employed[1].
The scars are still well visible. 26 thousand people[2] were forced to resettle to make way for the mines. Today three large open cast mines continue working in Brandenburg, the State containing Lusatia[3]. There are five coal power stations, including the Jänschwalde plant, the third most polluting industrial site in the European Union[4] and Germany’s second largest single CO2 emitter[5].
The logic of the job argument
However, the future of the lignite industry has been called in doubt lately. Sweden’s state owned utility Vattenfall, running most of the region’s mines and power plants, is now looking for an investor, planning to sell the whole industry by the first quarter of 2016. The initial intention of Stockholm’s red-green coalition government was to close down its German lignite plants, instead of selling them, to reduce the 50 million tonnes of annual CO2 output not just on the balance sheet of Vattenfall, but in the real world as well. The plan failed for legal reasons and it is now Greenpeace that has picked up on it[6].
Would not many who have an option to leave (the young and educated) take the chance instead of waiting and investing in a house and village that has the sword of Damocles hanging over it?
While this initially seemed a realistic option (it was unclear whether anyone would want to invest in the lignite sector), the social democrat-left government of the Brandenburg region has now announced plans to step in as a buyer. The government has declared it intends to continue running the lignite industry as a state company, if it has to[7]. The motives expressed by government officials are not primarily about profitability and tax income but about fending off the possible loss of 8200[8] jobs and closure of the last remaining industrial structure of Lusatia, with all this entails economically.
Although obviously ignoring climate and environmental questions, the job argument sounds credible in its logic. The lignite sector is still the single biggest employer in all of Brandenburg, and the single biggest tax payer (although together the smaller renewable businesses employ more people[9]). So the argument is that Lusatia is and will be better off with the income and jobs from lignite.
The lignite resource curse in industrial nations
We know that in many places in the world fossil fuel extraction did not bring widely distributed prosperity. Most notably a number of African countries proved quite the opposite. The revenues from oil, gas and uranium only fuelled military conflict and benefited a small group of ruling families in highly corrupt governments. The British economist Richard Auty coined the resulting long-term underdevelopment of resource-rich countries the “resource curse”[10].
Recent studies provide evidence that a resource curse also occurs in regions in industrial countries[11]. For example, a statistical analysis has found strong detrimental effects of the lignite industry for the Ústecký region in the Czech Republic. Compared with the rest of the country, the region is worse off in terms of the rate of allergies, life expectancy, abortion rates, unemployment, university degrees, business activity, tourism and emigration rates.[12]
The findings were confirmed by a second study for the whole country, showing a general rift between all lignite mining (and combustion) regions and those without a lignite industry[13]. Mining regions were found to be worse off with regard to multiple attributes of health, quality of life, social cohesion, unemployment, homelessness and crime.[14]
Statistical evidence for a resource curse in Lusatia
We tested the resource curse thesis for the Lusatia region with available statistics from the official year book Berlin-Brandenburg. Six attributes to measure quality of life and economic development were available for a comparison of Lusatia to the rest of the Brandenburg region: infant mortality, unemployment rate, private insolvency, job income, number of physicians and emigration/immigration rates. Except for private insolvency, Lusatia scored lower on all attributes than the larger Brandenburg area.
The strongest difference was found in emigration. While all other regions lose in average 0.4% annually of their population due to emigration, the figure is 1.4% in Lusatia. Secondly, Lusatia has fewer inhabitants with a high income (19.7%) than the rest of Brandenburg (25.3%). It has only 1.2 physicians per 1000 inhabitants compared to 1.6 in Brandenburg and 3.89 in Germany;[15] and its infant mortality rate is higher, 4.3 per thousand compared to 3 per thousand in Brandenburg. Even the unemployment level is slightly higher (12.9% compared to 12.6%) and private insolvency is on a par (0.3 per thousand).
Lusatia’s underdevelopment due to the lignite industry
It is no big surprise that air quality is worse in regions with mining and power plants, resulting in higher levels of disease and infant mortality.[16] What is more surprising, perhaps, is that there is no positive effect on jobs. On the contrary, the lignite region shows higher unemployment rates. Moreover, high-income households are relatively rare, since coal is not a high-paying sector.
So the 8200 jobs that mining offers seem to be overshadowed by adverse effects. As the numbers clearly show emigration is common. We know from other regions with high emigration rates that it is usually the young, healthy and educated who leave, depriving the region of qualified labour and initiative for business activities. For Lusatia there is a lack of precise data who is leaving, but the low number of physicians indicates that the pattern is the usual, the highly qualified turn their back on the region.
If mining is a drug in terms of industry jobs and local tax income, detoxification requires finding short-term solutions to achieve a better life in the long term
So if the mining, as the government argues, blesses the region with tax income and jobs, why are so many people leaving? 26,000 had to leave their villages during the last fifty years due to mine expansions. But since compensatory villages are constructed close by, that does not explain the overall population loss. The 26,000 resettled people may well have stayed at least in the region. Though many seem to have taken the opportunity, once uprooted, to leave altogether. This indicates other underlying causes than the resettling alone.
Health may be a reason. As a recent study from Greenpeace emphasised, the emissions from lignite plants affect people’s health negatively, causing heart and lung diseases, and contributing to 3100 premature deaths in 2010 alone[17]. This may also be a contributing reason for the lower number of business activities in the region, since sick people tend to work less than healthy ones.[18]
Another reason for emigration is difficult to measure in numbers but quite obvious from personal experience and from some documentary movies.[19] The forceful removal of villages often creates deep conflicts among the inhabitants. Some decide to leave early and manage to sell their land at higher prices than those who remain to fight, only to give up later, or those who resist as long as possible.[20] Even the breaking up of families who have lived there for many generations is not unusual. Children fall out with their parents about what to do with the house or the land they own, when having to decide between selling or staying. All this happens while some people, including relatives and neighbours benefit from the mines and power stations as employees.
The level of stress from bleak prospects probably sets in well before the bulldozers arrive. For example, the village Proschim[21] has been in peril of being put on the list of villages to be destroyed for ninety[22] years now. The process is mostly public and rumours spread quickly. Would not many who have an option to leave (the young and educated) take the chance instead of waiting and investing in a house and village that has the sword of Damocles hanging over it? As some studies show, sombre prospects can also be a motivation for emigration.
Long term relief requires short term sacrifice
It seems likely that the mining regions suffer from long-term selective emigration, a brain drain that deprives them of economic activity resulting in comparatively high overall unemployment numbers despite the mining jobs. What is more, the resulting underdevelopment leaves the region only more dependent on the mining industry, which in turn reinforces the emigration pattern, leading to a negative spiral.
In short, open cast mining in Germany’s Lusatia region has several detrimental effects, similar to what has been observed in other mining regions in industrial countries.[23] The negative effects may well exceed the positive effects of jobs and tax income from the lignite industry, a result also found in the Czech Republic. Like the Ústecký region Lusatia seems to suffer from a resource curse.
True, if mining were to stop, the situation might get worse in the short term. However, in the long run it might lead to lower emigration levels, less of a brain drain and better health conditions. Put in a nutshell, if mining is a drug in terms of industry jobs and local tax income, detoxification requires finding short-term solutions to achieve a better life in the long term.
Editor’s Note
Conrad Kunze is a sociologist and historian at the Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ. His website is www.energie-demokratie.de. See also his path-breaking article published in February on Energy Post: The myth of the dark side of the Energiewende. Anika Zorn, who compiled the statistics for the article during an internship at UFZ in 2015, studies Geography and Political Science at Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg.
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Literature
Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (2013). Das Lausitzer Braunkohlerevier, retrieved from http://www.politische-bildung-brandenburg.de/node/9615 (12/11/2015).
Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (2014). Liegt die Zukunft der Lausitz unter der Erde? Eine Sommertour zum Thema Energie, retrieved from http://politische-bildung-brandenburg.de/node/10587 (12/11/2015).
Frantál, B./ Nováková, E. (2014): A curse of coal? Exploring unintended regional consequences of coal energy in the czech republic. In: Morvian Geographical Reports, Vol. 22, Nr. 2, S. 55-65. DOI: 10.2478/mgr20140012.
Greenpeace (2013). Tod aus dem Schlot. Wie Kohlekraftwerke unsere Gesundheit runieren, retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/greenpeace-studie-tod-aus-dem-schlot-s01652.pdf (12/11/2015).
Greenpeace (2015). Statement of interest for the acquisition of Vattenfalls’ German lignite activities, retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/vattenfall_statement_of_interest.pdf (12/11/2015).
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung/BUND. Friends of the Earth Germany (2015). Kohleatlas 2015. Stürtz GmbH. Würzburg.
Heinzel-Berndt, A./ Heuer, C. (2009). Bedrohte Lausitz. Die Tagebauplanungen und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Naturschönheiten der Region. BUND. Friends of the earth Germany, retrieved from http://www.bund-brandenburg.de/fileadmin/bundgruppen/lvbrandenburg/Verschiedenes/Bedrohte_Lausitz.pdf (12/11/2015).
Hirschl, B./ Heinbach, K./ Aretz, A./ Salecki, S. (2012). Effekte der Ausbaupläne für Erneuerbare Energien bis 2020 auf Arbeitsplätze und Wertschöpfung. Institut für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung, retrieved from http://www.ioew.de/fileadmin/_migrated/tx_ukioewdb/Effekte_der_Ausbauplaene_fuer_EE_bis_2020_auf_Arbeitsplaetze_und_Wertschoepfung.pdf (12/11/2015).
Küchler, S./Wronski, R. (2014). Kostenrisiken für die Gesellschaft durch den deutschen Braunkohletagebau. Green Budget Germany – Forum ökologisch-soziale Marktwirtschaft/Greenpeace, retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/studie-folgekosten-braunkohle.pdf , p. 6 (12/11/2015).
Tiede, P. (2014). Kauft sich das Land bald bei Vattenfall ein?, retrieved from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/braunkohle-in-brandenburg-kauft-sich-das-land-bald-bei-vattenfall-ein/9387626.html (12/11/2015).
[1] Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (2013). Das Lausitzer Braunkohlerevier, retrieved from http://www.politische-bildung-brandenburg.de/node/9615 (12/11/2015).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Küchler, S./Wronski, R. (2014). Kostenrisiken für die Gesellschaft durch den deutschen Braunkohletagebau. Green Budget Germany – Forum ökologisch-soziale Marktwirtschaft/Greenpeace, retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/studie-folgekosten-braunkohle.pdf, p. 6 (12/11/2015).
[4] European Environmental Agency EEA (2011), Factsheet Costs of Air Pollution, http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/cost-of-air-pollution/spreadsheet/download
[5] Greenpeace (2011). Wie der Klimakiller Braunkohle die Lausitz zerstört, http://www.greenpeace.de/files/20110501-Klimakiller-Braunkohle-Lausitz.pdf
[6] Greenpeace (2015). Statement of interest for the acquisition of Vattenfalls’ German lignite activities, retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/vattenfall_statement_of_interest.pdf (12/11/2015).
[7] Tiede, P. (2014). Kauft sich das Land bald bei Vattenfall ein?, retrieved from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/braunkohle-in-brandenburg-kauft-sich-das-land-bald-bei-vattenfall-ein/9387626.html (12/11/2015).
[8] Brandenburgische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (2014). Liegt die Zukunft der Lausitz unter der Erde? Eine Sommertour zum Thema Energie, retrieved from http://politische-bildung-brandenburg.de/node/10587 (12/11/2015).
[9] Hirschl, B./ Heinbach, K./ Aretz, A./ Salecki, S. (2012). Effekte der Ausbaupläne für Erneuerbare Energien bis 2020 auf Arbeitsplätze und Wertschöpfung. Institut für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung, retrieved from http://www.ioew.de/fileadmin/_migrated/tx_ukioewdb/Effekte_der_Ausbauplaene_fuer_EE_bis_2020_auf_Arbeitsplaetze_und_Wertschoepfung.pdf, p. 19 (12/11/2015).
[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource_curse
[11] Papyrakis et al. 2008, Hajkowicz et al. 2011.
[12] Hnutí Duha (Kubáňová, 2007.
[13] Frantál, B./ Nováková, E. (2014): A curse of coal? Exploring unintended regional consequences of coal energy in the czech republic. In: Morvian Geographical Reports, Vol. 22, Nr. 2, S. 5565. DOI: 10.2478/mgr20140012.
[14] Ibid., p. 62.
[15] CIA Factbook (2015), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2226.html
[16] cf. Frantal/Novakova 2014 and Greenpeace study on deaths / Jänschwalde.
[17] Greenpeace (2013). Tod aus dem Schlot. Wie Kohlekraftwerke unsere Gesundheit runieren, retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/greenpeace-studie-tod-aus-dem-schlot-s01652.pdf, p. 10 (12/11/2015).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Energieland (2012), Johanna Ickert; Brückenjahre (2014), Peter Benedix; Auf der Kippe (2015), Marko Kühne et al..
[20] The village Lacoma resisted until police forces came in, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lakoma.
[21] Heinzel-Berndt, A./ Heuer, C. (2009). Bedrohte Lausitz. Die Tagebauplanungen und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Naturschönheiten der Region. BUND. Friends of the earth Germany, retrieved from http://www.bund-brandenburg.de/fileadmin/bundgruppen/lvbrandenburg/Verschiedenes/Bedrohte_Lausitz.pdf, p.7 (12/11/2015).
[22] Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung/BUND. Friends of the Earth Germany (2015). Kohleatlas 2015. Stürtz GmbH. Würzburg, p. 25.
[23] Frantál, B./ Nováková, E. (2014): A curse of coal? Exploring unintended regional consequences of coal energy in the czech republic. In: Morvian Geographical Reports, Vol. 22, Nr. 2, S. 5565. DOI: 10.2478/mgr20140012.
one.second says
So sad that a meager 8000 jobs keep a whole region hostage while killing their babies in the process. Sigmar Gabriel destroyed more than 50000 jobs in the solar sector alone with his attacks on the EEG and the rest of the SPD/CDU not giving a damn. This is actually insane. Oh well, people seem to like it that way, otherwise they wouldn’t vote for them.
Jeffrey Michel says
Lignite surface mines cannot be switched on and off like power plants. They constitute half-century investments in landscape engineering that the German government has provided with numerous ancillary subsidies for infrastructure development. The Lusatian mines are still operated according to GDR mining law. When national reunification took place in 1990, there were 49 briquette factories processing lignite in eastern Germany, compared with only one remaining today. Even the Green Party predicted only 12.5% renewable grid power by 2012, a figure that has since more than doubled. Until 2013, CCS was still an official part of the German Energiewende. Its successful implementation would have required that even more lignite be mined than is currently the case. These examples illustrate the futility of making any reliable long-term predictions on the lignite industry. The Czech energy corporation CEZ has succinctly confirmed that if it should buy Vattenfall’s lignite assets, it will not do so for the purpose of retiring the power stations in Lusatia.
Karel Beckman says
Note that Vattenfall on 22 September officially announced the sale of its German lignite generation and mining assets (http://corporate.vattenfall.com/press-and-media/press-releases/2015/vattenfall-announces-next-step-in-lignite-sale-process/). According to German press reports, there are four potential bidders in the race: three Czech companies (CEZ, EPH and Czech Coal) and the German utility Steag. The State of Brandenburg therefore no longer needs to step in as buyer of last resort, which it may have done if there had been no bidders. The editor.
Jeffrey Michel says
Further substantiation of the declining contribution of coal mining to employment and to overall gross national product is provided in Section 2.6 “The Mining Curse” of my 2004/2008 study “Status and Impacts of the German Lignite Industry”. As shown in the graph on page 19, consistently above-average unemployment levels prevail in all four eastern German lignite counties as well as in the coal counties of all 16 mining states in the United States: http://www.airclim.org/sites/default/files/documents/APC18SE.pdf
Kent Doering says
New forms of ignition are being developed. Low oxygen ignition produces carbon monoxide- which can be used as a fuel in conjunction- with magnetic resonance, ionized steam dissociation. That is, the lignite plants can all be upgraded to combined cycle gas and steam- doubling output, while reducing carbon emissions. The same system that does magnetic resonance, ionized steam dissociation, also does the same thing with captured carbon from the fuel and from the air.
I.E.: with magnetic resonance ionized steam dissociation, and carbon dissociation, plus upgrading with combined cycle, and co ignition, a plant becomes “carbon emission free” as its emissions are captued,brolen down andconveredro liquid fuels.